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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WADE WAGSTAFF,

J

Petitioner/Appellant, :
v.

:

ELDON BARNES, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,
Respondent.

:

BRIEF

OF

Case No. 890663-CA

Priority Three

R E S P O N D E N T

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for
postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which was filed by petitioner in Third District
Court and determined by the Honorable Frank G. Noel.

This Court

has jurisdiction in this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989) and Rule 65B(i)(10), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether petitioner has supported his allegations

with adequate citations to the record and the law, and whether he
has adequately preserved the issues for appeal.
2.

Whether the trial court was misled by counsel for

the respondent which would entitle petitioner to relief from the
dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

dismissing petitioner's petition for postconviction relief.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. Civ, P. 65B(i):
(1) Postconviction hearings.
(1) Any person imprisoned in the
penitentiary or county jail under a
commitment of any court, whether such
imprisonment be under an original commitment
or under a commitment for violation of
probation or parole, who asserts that in any
proceedings which resulted in his commitment
there was a substantial denial of his rights
under the Constitution of the United States
or of the state of Utah, or both, may
institute a proceeding under this rule.
Such proceedings shall be commenced by
filing a complaint, together with a copy
thereof, with the clerk of the court in which
such relief is sought. The complainant shall
also serve a copy of the complaint so filed
upon the attorney general of the state of
Utah if imprisoned in the state prison, or
the county attorney of the county where
imprisoned if in a county jail. Such service
may be made by any of the methods provide for
service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, or by mailing such copy to the
attorney general or county attorney by United
States mail, postage prepaid, and by filing
with the clerk of said court a certificate of
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was
so mailed to the attorney general or county
attorney. Upon the filing of such a
complaint, the clerk shall promptly bring the
same to the attention of the presiding judge
of the court in which such complaint is
filed.
(2) The complaint shall state that the
person seeking relief is illegally restrained
of his liberty by the defendant; shall state
the place where he is so restrained; shall
state the dates of and identify the
proceedings in which the complainant was
convicted and by which he was subsequently
confined and of which he now complains; and
shall set forth in plain and concise terms
the factual data constituting each and every
manner in which th€* complainant claims that
any constitutional rights were violated. The
complaint shall have attached thereto

affidavits, copies of the same are not
attached.
The complaint shall also state whether or
not the judgment of conviction that resulted
in the confinement complained of has been
reviewed on appeal, and if so, shall identify
such appellate proceedings and state the
results thereof.
The complaint shall further state that the
legality or constitutionality of his
commitment or confinement has not already
been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus or
other similar proceedings; and if the
complainant shall have instituted prior
similar proceedings in any court, state of
federal, within the state of Utah, he shall
so state in his complaint, shall attach a
copy of any pleading filed in such court by
him to his complaint, and shall set forth the
reasons for the denial of relief in such
other court. In such case, if it is apparent
to the court in which the proceeding under
this rule is instituted that the legality or
constitutionality of his confinement has
already been adjudged in such prior
proceedings, the court shall forthwith
dismiss such complaint, giving written notice
thereof by mail to the complainant, and no
further proceedings shall be had on such
complaint.
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of
authorities shall not be set forth in the
complaint, but may be set out in a separate
supporting memorandum or brief if the
complainant so desires.
(4) All claims of the denial of any of
complainant's constitutional rights shall be
raised in the postconviction proceeding
brought under this rule and may not be raised
in another subsequent proceedings except for
good cause shown therein.
(5) [Deleted.]
(6) Within ten days after service of a
copy of the complaint upon him, the attorney
general, or the county attorney, as the case
may be, shall answer the complaint or
otherwise plead thereto. Any further
pleadings or amendments shall be in

conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(7) When an answer is filed, the court
shall immediately set the case for a hearing
within twenty days thereafter unless the
court in its discretion determines that
further time is needed. Prior to the hearing,
the state or county shall obtain such
transcript of proceedings or court records or
upon the request of either party, may order a
prehearing conference if good reason exists
therefor; but such conference shall not be
set so as to unreasonably delay the hearing
on the merits of the complaint. The
complainant shall be brought before the court
for any hearing or conference.
If the court in which the complaint is
filed determines the case, shall enter
specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law and judgment, in writing, and the same
shall be made a part of the record in the
case.
If the court finds in favor of the
complainant, it shall enter an appropriate
order with respect to the judgment or
sentence in the former proceedings and such
further orders with respect to rearraignment,
pretrial, custody, bail or discharge as the
court may deem just and proper in the case.
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay
the costs of the proceedings, he may proceed
in forma pauperis upon the filing of an
affidavit to that effect, in which event the
court may direct the costs to be paid by the
county in which he was originally charged.
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such
complaint may be appealed to and reviewed by
the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in
civil cases.
R. Utah Ct. App. 24(e):
(e) References in briefs to the record.
References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript,
or to pages of any statement of the evidence
or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References

to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers.
If reference is made to the pages of the
transcript at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or
rejected,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Wade Wagstaff, was convicted on June 30,
1987, in First District Court, Cache County, of burglary, a
second degree felony, and assault, a class B misdemeanor (R. 57).
He subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, the
subject of this action, in Third District Court, Salt Lake County
(R. 2). The warden of the Utah State Prison, represented by
Barbara Bearnson, Assistant Attorney General, filed a motion to
dismiss (R. 77), to which Petitioner filed a reply (R. 88). The
matter was heard on August 14, 1989, before the Honorable Frank
G. Noel.

Following argument, the matter was taken under

advisement, and Judge Noel subsequently granted the warden's
motion to dismiss (R. 103). Petitioner now appeals the dismissal
of the petition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The procedural aspects of the case set forth in the
"Statement of the Case" are incorporated in the Statement of
Facts.

Petitioner did not make part of the record on appeal the

transcript of the August 14, 1989, hearing on the motion to
dismiss before Judge Noel.
Additional relevant facts are contained in the
transcript of the criminal trial held on June 30, 1987 (R. 1458).

Petitioner failed to appear at trial; he had previously

failed to report to his parole officer and the state did not know
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his whereabouts (R. 16). Petitioner's attorney, Herm Olson, was
present at trial (R. 17) and represented to the court his efforts
on five or six occasions to notify petitioner of the trial date;
only one the letters was r€*turned (R. 17-19).

Petitioner had, in

fact, called Mr. Olson to discuss the case sometime between March
and May (R. 18). Petitioner was obviously aware that the
criminal proceedings were pending; he would have been present
during a preliminary hearing and was arraigned in the district
court on July 28, 1986, and again on October 27, 1986 (R. 21).
In making its decision to proceed in petitioner's
absence, the trial court found that petitioner had previously
been in court on the matter and was, therefore, aware of the
proceedings, and then discontinued communication with his
attorney (R. 26). It also found that petitioner voluntarily
failed to maintain required contact with his parole officer (R.
27).

It further found that the notices sent to petitioner were

either not received or ignored and that petitioner had made no
effort to contact either his parole officer or his counsel
concerning his next required appearance (R. 27). The court found
that his failure to appear was a voluntary act and allowed the
state to proceed in his absence (R. 27). His attorney was then
allowed to withdraw (R. 27). Following presentation of the
evidence, the jury returned verdicts of guilty.
Petitioner appealed his subsequently filed motion for
new trial and arrest of judgment to this Court.

In State of Utah

v. Wade Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court
affirmed the trial court's judgment.

On appeal, petitioner

claimed that he was not voluntarily absent from trial as the
result of a "leak" from the county attorney's office regarding
his agreement to provide information; he claimed this leak
resulted in his being in fear for his personal safety and,
therefore, he left the area.
actual notice of the trial.

He also claimed that he did not get
This Court noted petitioner's trial

counsel's attempt to withdraw from representation on March 16,
1987, because of petitioner's failure to maintain contact with
him.

This Court also discussed trial counsel's numerous attempts

to notify petitioner of the court dates.

This Court further

noted petitioner's failure to appear for the June 30, 1987 trial,
although his court-appointed attorney was present.

This Court

held that petitioner failed in his duty to maintain contact with
his attorney and could not benefit from his claim that he was
voluntarily absent from his trial.

This Court also found

petitioner's claim that he did not have actual notice to be
without merit, as Rule 3(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides for service upon an attorney representing a party, and
petitioner had failed in his duty to maintain contact with his
attorney.
When dismissing petitioner's petition for
postconviction relief, Judge Noel found that petitioner was
represented by counsel ur until his trial date when, because of
petitioner's failure to cooperate, counsel was allowed to
withdraw.

The court also found that petitioner had voluntarily

absented himself from trial.

The court found that petitioner had

raised the issues in his direct appeal that he raised in his

petition for postconviction relief.

Specifically, petitioner

submitted a four-page letter to this Court in which he raised the
claim that he was denied the right to counsel at trial and that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue
on appeal.

Judge Noel concluded that petitioner's failure to

appear at trial was voluntary, and that by voluntarily absenting
himself from the trial and thereby not being available to assist
counsel in his defense, he could not be heard to complain that he
was denied counsel.

(R. 103, 109-111.)

Petitioner now claims in his appeal from the dismissal
of his action that counsel for the state made fraudulent
misrepresentations to the court and "amended" his cause of
action.

He also claims that the trial court failed to adequately

examine the record and dismissed his petition in the face of
constitutional violations.

He further claims that the trial

court erred in dismissing the action on "collateral estoppel"
grounds.

Finally, petitioner claims these errors deprived him of

equal protection and due process.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner has failed to properly cite to the record
and to adequately cite legal authority to support his claims, and
has failed to preserve the issues for appeal.
The trial court was adequately informed of the facts at
trial and was not misled by counsel for the respondent.

The

court had all relevant information at hand when it made its
decision to dismiss the petition for postconviction relief.

-Q-

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the petition for postconviction relief and
petitioner's claims are not supported by the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW AND ARE, THEREFORE, NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.
Petitioner's statement of the facts, which is contained
in the statement of the case section of his brief, does not
contain a single reference to the record.

Not only does he fail

to cite to the record in support of his contentions, there are
numerous misrepresentations of fact and references to alleged
facts that were never made part of the record.

As a result of

petitioner's failures to adequately cite to the record, not to
mention his misrepresentations of the record, this Court should
assume the correctness of the judgment of the trial court.

R.

Utah Ct. App. 24(e); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Further, in order to preserve the issue for appeal,
petitioner must have lodged an objection before the trial court
and state specific grounds for the objection.

Petitioner failed

For example, petitioner claims that his appellate counsel made
an argument before this Court that "misdirected" the court
regarding his representation at trial by an attorney.
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 5. He also claims that counsel for
the state failed to explain the facts to the trial court during
the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Petitioner's Opening Brief
at 6. There is nothing in the record to support this claim as
petitioner did not make the transcript of the hearing part of the
record on appeal.
-Q-

to object on any ground which he now claims entitles him to
reversal on appeal.

Consequently, this Court should disregard

his claims and summarily affirm the trial court.

Utah R. Evid.

103; State v. Schreuder# 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986).
Finally, this Court should summarily affirm the trial
court's order of dismissal as petitioner's brief is not "concise,
presented with accuracy . . . and is not free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters."
24(k).

R. Utah Ct. App.

His arguments are unintelligible and are not supported by

relevant legal support.
his claims.

As a result, this Court should disregard

Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d

1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION
BEFORE IT AND THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A
CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS MISLED BY RESPONDENT.
Petitioner claims in Point I on his brief that counsel
for respondent
Misconstrued the Actual Cause of Action that
Petitioner was Denied trial Counsel
Representation (Simply One Contention), and
By Fraudulent Mean's [sic] Amended three
Additional Contentions that, 1, the Court of
Appeal's [sic] Failed to Address this Issue;
2, that his Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective
For his Refusal to Raise this Issue on Direct
Appeal; and 3, that Petitioner was Denied Due
Process and Equal Protection of the Law;
Which She is Simply not at Liberty do Do
Without Adverse Party Consent.
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 8-9.

He also claims that counsel

for respondent "Misdirected the Court that Petitioner's Claim was
Barred By Collateral Estoppel Pre-requisits [sic]."

Id. at 9.

Petitioner provides no citations to the record in support of his

claim, and his only legal support

does not support his argument.

First, there is no dispute that petitioner was absent
at trial and that his counsel was allowed to withdraw after
making an appearance but before evidence was presented by the
6tate.

In the postconviction proceeding, the trial court was

informed of this situation and had before it not only
respondent's motion to dismiss and memorandum in support of the
motion, but many other documents upon which it based its
conclusion.

These documents included all information filed by

petitioner.

For example, the trial court had before it

petitioner's original petition for postconviction relief and his
reply to the motion to dismiss (R. 2, 88). Additionally the
trial court had the transcript of the trial which unequivocally
establishes the events at trial, including the fact that
petitioner's counsel was allowed to withdraw (R. 15-58).

The

court also had before it petitioner's letter to this Court in
which he briefed the lack of trial counsel issue, which this
Court considered on appeal (R. 64-68), and a copy of this Court's
opinion in the original appeal (R. 69-75).
Respondent's motion in support of his motion to dismiss
was fully supported by the record, case law, and legal argument.
Given the adequacy of the record the trial court had before it,
petitioner's unsupported claim that respondent somehow misled or
committed a fraud upon the court is totally without merit.

McGarien v. McGarien, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972) and
Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980).
-i i _

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF.
Petitioner claims in Point II of his brief that the
trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition for
postconviction relief by:

1) allowing counsel for respondent to

commit fraud upon the court as alleged in point I, 2) failing to
examine the evidence presented by petitioner, 3) dismissing the
petition for postconviction relief even though there had been
substantial violations of state and federal constitutional
provisions, and 4) dismissing the petition "on the grounds of a
factually erroneous collateral estoppel defense."

Appellant's

Opening Brief at 11-19.
Petitioner's first assertion can be summarily disposed
of based upon the argument in Point II of this brief.

Petitioner

has failed to show fraud by respondent.
Petitioner's second and third assertions can be
condensed into one for sake of effective argument, since both
arguments are based upon the erroneous assumption that the trial
court failed to adequately scrutinize petitioner's position.

His

position appears to be that the only possible explanation for the
trial court's denial of the petition is that the trial court
failed to consider his evidence.

In reviewing a denial of

postconviction relief, the Utah Supreme Court has held,
[W]e survey the record in the light most
favorable to the findings and judgment; and
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable
basis therein to support the trial court's
refusal to be convinced that the writ should
be granted." Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d
_1 O

229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1967); see
also Richardson v. Sullivan, 700 P.2d 534,
537 (Colo. 1985); Schad v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d
345, 347, 496 P.2d 263, 264-65 (1972);
Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 165, 435
P.2d 287, 288 (1967). . . .
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988).

Likewise, this

Court in Gomm v. Cook, 754 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987), held that
"In reviewing a challenge to a trial court's factual findings, we
apply a 'clearly erroneous' standard.

That standard requires that

'if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings . .
will be set aside.'"
The trial court determined that the petition should be
dismissed and based its decision upon the following findings:

1)

Petitioner was represented by counsel up to the date of trial
when, because of petitioner's lack of cooperation, trial counsel
was allowed to withdraw, 2) petitioner voluntarily absented
himself from trial, 3) though appellate counsel did not brief the
issue of lack of trial counsel, petitioner supplemented the brief
with a four page letter to the Court of Appeals in which he
presented legal argument and support for his contention of error,
and 4) the Court of Appeals found that petitioner was represented
by counsel but voluntarily absented himself from trial and was,
therefore, properly tried in absentia (R. 109). The trial court
also found that by voluntarily absenting himself from trial, and
thereby not being available to assist counsel in his defense,
petitioner was not in a position to complain that he was denied
-13-

the assistance of counsel (R. 110). The record fully supports the
trial court's dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner has failed to

establish that there was no reasonable basis for the trial court's
determination or that the decision was "clearly erroneous."
Petitioner's final claim in Point II of his brief is
that "the Court's Reliance Upon Erroneous Information in
Supporting A Collateral Estoppel Bar, and Dismissal was 'manifest
Error' mandating Reversal. . . . "
19.

Appellant's Opening Brief at

He, again, asserts that misrepresentations were made to this

Court at oral argument in the initial appeal, and by counsel for
respondent during argument on the motion to dismiss the
postconviction petition.

Again, petitioner makes no attempt to

provide record support for his claim and, in fact, there is none.
And, again, the issue was not preserved below.

As previously

argued, this, alone, should result in summary denial of his claim.
Regardless, petitioner's argument is unintelligible.
Perhaps his argument is that the trial court erred in dismissing
his petition on the grounds that the issues had been raised on
direct appeal and were, therefore, barred from review in a
postconviction proceeding.

The trial court did not make this

specific finding in its decision to dismiss the petition.
However, such a finding would be legally correct.

It is well

established that postconviction proceedings cannot perform the
function of regular appellate review.

See, e.g., Codianna v.

Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816
(Utah), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); Rammel v. Smith, 560
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977).
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In petitioner's final argument, set forth in Point III
of his brief, he essentially restates the arguments made in Points
I and II and claims that the errors establish a violation of his
rights to due process and equal protection.

The trial court found

that petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated.
Petitioner has not established that the trial court's findings of
fact were clearly erroneous, Gomm v. Cook, 745 P.2d 1226, 1228
(Utah Ct. App, 1988), or that it abused its discretion in
dismissing the petition.
1988).

Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah

Petitioner was not denied due process or equal protection,

and this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed the petition for
postconviction relief filed by Wade Wagstaff.

For the reasons

discussed above, and any additional reasons advanced at oral
argument, the respondent requests that this Court affirm the
decision of the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ; 3 r Uay of March, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Wade Wagstaff, pro se, P. 0. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 on
this J ^ T T g a y of March, 1990.
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